The Impact of Government Subsidies on the Alliance Mechanism Between Microgrids and Shared Energy Storage Under A Three-Party Evolutionary Game

Abstract

Aggregating distributed renewable energy (RE), flexible loads, and energy storage (ES) in microgrids (MGs) is a feasible option for optimizing energy structures and facilitating the low-carbon transformation of power systems. The shared energy storage (SES) model, as an emerging business model, can reduce the resource waste issues caused by the ES configuration of individual MGs, and connect multiple MGs to achieve energy sharing among different MGs. However, the cooperation between MGs and SES is influenced by government subsidies. The transition to a sustainable energy system requires a strong policy and regulatory framework to support the deployment of RE MGs and ES systems. This paper addresses the cooperation between MGs and SES. Firstly, considering the limited rationality of participants, it proposes an evolutionary game approach to analyze the impact of government subsidies on their alliance mechanism. Secondly, it demonstrates the stability of the equilibrium points in the aforementioned game model, discusses the equilibrium stability of the system under different gaming scenarios and their influencing factors, and further analyzes the dynamic behavioral characteristics of trilateral evolution. Finally, the impact of different initial strategy states, subsidy costs, penalty amounts, and profit statuses on the behavior of each party is discussed. The results confirm the validity of the proposed model.